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NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM: THE
WILSONIAN LEGACY
LoRI FIsLER DA~moscH*
I.

INTRODUCTION

No twentieth-century leader has had greater influence on
the parallel development of both nationalism and internationalism than Woodrow Wilson. Wilson gave expression to the
nationalist aspirations of peoples around the world, through
his endorsement of the principle of self-determination. He
also initiated the first institution that had as its objective the
organization of the international community to apply concerted power in support of universal values. My task is to examine one contemporary problem-intervention-in the
light of some of the themes implicit in the Wilsonian legacy.
Among these themes will be the establishment (and now the
invigoration) of collective organs for the achievement of community objectives; the engagement of the United States in
those collective activities; the advancement of democracy
through U.S. initiatives, whether alone or in combination with
like-minded states; and the articulation of normative principles against which all the above activities could be measured.
Debates in the 1990s about the wisdom or justification of
intervention must reckon not only with Wilsonian ideals, but
also with the imprint of American interventions during Wilson's presidency. In the second half of 1993, plans were underway to send an international mission to Haiti as part of a
series of efforts to quell disorder and to achieve democratic
governance there.1 Wilson sent the U.S. Marines to Haiti in
1915 with some of the same objectives; they stayed until 1934.
* Professor of Law, Columbia of University. This paper dram upon
several recent writings of the author on related topics, especially ENFORCING
RAI~n COLLECTIVE IRVENm ION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS (Lori Fisler
Damrosch ed., 1993), and Changing Conceptions of Intevention in Internalional
Law, in EMERGING NoR is OF JusTrED INTERVENTION (in LW. Reed & C.
Kaysen eds., 1993). Many thanks to the organizations sponsoring those two
projects, and to the participants in their respective studies on intervention.
for incalculable contributions to my own efforts.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 7-21 (concerning the origins and

the collapse, or at least the interruption, of these plans).
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By beginning with this example, I am not venturing to predict
the duration of a possible U.N. intervention in Haiti nor am I
urging any particular "exit strategy." Rather, I present this example to serve as a reminder that the historical record of unilateral U.S. interventions in the hemisphere-pursued not
only by Wilson,2 but also by many of his predecessors and successors-has led to strenuous objections from states that have
been (or feared that they might become) targets of U.S. interventions. Those objections have been expressed emphatically
in legal documents codifying a norm of non-intervention,
which remains the starting point for discourse on the subject
among international lawyers.
The Wilson presidency heightened concerns about such
abuses, but, paradoxically, Wilsonianism in the larger sense
has contributed to the development of norms and institutions
through which opposition to unilateral intervention could be
mobilized. To bring the irony full circle, the same institutions
are now the ones through which Presidents Bush and Clinton
have transformed unilateral into collective interventions and
have thereby sought to multiply U.S. leverage over foreign developments.
In the post-Cold War period, international law is moving
beyond a system of constraints on unilateralstate action to become a more effective system aimed at channeling the collective
efforts of the international community toward the realization
of widely shared values. The norm of nonintervention retains
vitality-some might say deserves revitalization-when the
question is restraining states from unilateral projections of
power into what international law has traditionally viewed as
the "internal affairs" or "domestic jurisdiction" of other states.
With respect to collective activities, the U.N. Charter embodies
provisions indicative of the constraints on the organization
that were appropriate in 1945, but those provisions need not
thwart the development of powers to "intervene" in situations
that press a claim on the conscience of all humanity. The challenge is to clarify normative conceptions and procedural safeguards that render it acceptable for collective organs to do
what no one state should be allowed to do alone.
The U.N. Security Council's application of the concept of
"threat to peace" has undergone a dramatic evolution in
the
2. In Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic.
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three years since it authorized a collective response to Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait. The Council has found "threats to peace"
in Iraq's repression of its Kurdish population in 1991,3 in the

chaos gripping Somalia in 1992-93, 4 in Haiti's political crisis
(which began in 1991 but was characterized as a "threat to
peace" for the first time in June 1993),5 and in several other
cases that likewise push well beyond traditional conceptions. 6
Large segments of the international community have been
willing to endorse strong collective action in a wide range of
situations, of which the following are illustrative, though not
exclusive:
Genocide, "ethnic cleansing," war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and similar atrocities entailing
loss of life on a mass scale;
Interference with the delivery of humanitarian relief to endangered civilian populations;
Violations of cease-fire agreements;
Collapse of civil order, entailing substantial loss of
life and precluding the possibility of identifying
any authority capable of granting or withholding
consent to international involvement; and
Irregular interruption of democratic governance.
Three contemporary cases-Haiti, Yugoslavia, and Iraq-illustrate the interplay of differing aspects of the Wilsonian legacy
with respect to the twin themes of nationalism and internationalism.

3. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/47, at 31
(1991) discussed in the text accompanying note 43 infra.
4. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/48, at 63
(1992).
5. S.C. Res. 841, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 Uune 16, 1993).
6. For aspects of the situation in the former Yugoslavia, see infra, text at
note 29. Other recent innovations are found in the Security Council's responses to continuing strife in Liberia (see S.C. Res. 788, U.N. SCOR, 47th
Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/48, at99 (1992)) and Angola (seeS.C. Res. 864, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/864 (Sept. 15, 1993)). The unique case of Cambodia is discussed in ENFORCING RESTRA1Nr. COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL
CoN-LIcTs 241-73, 382-84 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993).
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CURRENT CASES

A.

Haiti

I will begin the Haitian story not on the island of Hispaniola, but in Mexico during Wilson's presidency, and then I
will turn not to Port-au-Prince but to Santiago de Chile in
1991.
International law casebooks take note of Wilson's position
on a matter of considerable doctrinal importance, namely,
whether a regime that comes to power extraconstitutionally, or
in violation of democratic processes, should be granted diplomatic recognition. In the case of General Huerta's overthrow
of President Madero's government in Mexico in 1913, Wilson
refused recognition, explaining that "a just government rests
always upon the consent of the governed." 7 International lawyers have generally agreed with politicians, political scientists
and historians that Wilson's policy with respect to Huerta was
ill-suited to be (or to become) a "principle"-it simply could
not be applied to anything like a consistent category of cases. 8
The Mexican government itself later formulated what also
purported to be a statement of principle, taking the opposite
position from Wilson. The "Estrada Doctrine," named for
Mexico's foreign minister, insisted that it was improper to use
the grant or denial of recognition as a means of passing judgment on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of other governments. 9
One might have thought that such a "doctrine" of dealing with
any government in effective control, would be susceptible to
consistent application. Mexico itself, however, apparently refrained from relations with the Franco government of Spain
for over three decades. 10 In view of such discrepancies between proclaimed doctrine (whether Wilson's or Estrada's)
and actual practice, various commentators have concluded
7. RESTATEMENT (TrHIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, sec. 203, note 1 (1987) (citing HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, vol. 1, p. 181 (1940)).
8. As then-Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher put it in a
1977 address, "Wilson's exception proved too rigid in practice and it rather

quickly succumbed to the stress of reality." Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERLus 243 (2d ed. 1987).
9. Statement of Mexican Foreign Minister Estrada (1930), excerpted in
2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 85-86 (1963).
10. HENKJN ET AL., supra note 8, at 248.
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that governmental behavior with respect to recognition tends
to reflect expediency rather than principle.
Yet in Santiago, Chile, in June 1991, at a moment when
the countries of the American hemisphere all possessed governments with some color of democratic legitimacy,"' the Organization of American States adopted a declaration that led
within a few months to collective implementation of something rather like Wilson's policy toward Huerta. The operative
passage of the Santiago Declaration commits the OAS to act
collectively "in the event of any occurrences giving rise to the
sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political
institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by
the democratically elected government in any of the Organization's member states."12 Within four months, this declaration
was called into play upon the overthrow of President Aristide's
government in Haiti. Among the first decisions the OAS took
in response to the Haitian crisis was to decide that only President Aristide's representatives would be viewed as legitimate
within the organs of the inter-American system, and furthermore to "recommend, with due respect for the policy of each
member state on the recognition of states and governments,
action to bring about the diplomatic isolation of those who
hold power illegally in Haiti."13 The first wave of OAS-recommended economic sanctions followed a few days later, as did a
resolution of the U.N. General Assembly appealing to the
states take measures in supUnited Nations that all member
4
port of the OAS actions.'
Despite a crippling but porous hemispheric embargo, Haiti's de facto government remains in power and President Aistide remains in exile more than two years later. Haiti's military
rulers did not take the international efforts seriously untilJune
1993, when the U.N. Security Council imposed a mandatory
oil embargo and related sanctions (including an embargo on
arms, police equipment, and petroleum products, and a freeze
of the assets of the Haitian government and de facto authori11. Cuba is the notable exception.
12. RepresentativeDemocracy, OAS Doc. AG/RES 1080 (June 5, 1991).
13. Support to themDeocraticGovernment of Haii, OAS Doc. MRE/RES 1/91
(Oct. 3, 1991).
14. GA Res. 46/7, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 13 (1991).
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ties). 15 The U.N. embargo of Haiti is noteworthy as a new step
in the Security Council's willingness to deal with an internal
political crisis as a threat to international peace and security.
The Haitian sanctions resolution goes farther than any other
to date in applying universal, mandatory, and severe economic
sanctions to influence a domestic political crisis over democratic governance. Its cautious wording (stressing more than
once the "unique and exceptional" circumstances) cannot
hide its precedential significance.
The Security Council suspended sanctions on August 27,
1993, after the U.N. Secretary-General reported that the de
facto authorities had begun implementing in good faith the
July 1993 Governors Island Agreement for reinstating President Aristide's government. 16 The outright political murder
of Aristide's supporters, including his minister ofjustice, after
suspension of the sanctions shattered any illusion of compli7
ance with this good faith standard.'
A crucial step in the U.N. plan was to have been the deployment of international personnel to ensure a peaceful transition and to begin the rebuilding of a shattered nation. The
Security Council approved the dispatch of a 1,300-member
force on September 23, 1993,18 but a violent demonstration
orchestrated by the de facto authorities blocked the debarkation of the first contingent arriving on a U.S. troop carrier,
which then withdrew from Haitian waters. 19
On October 13, 1993, the Security Council unanimously
voted to reimpose the suspended sanctions. 2 0 Doubts are
growing as to whether this effort to restore democratic govern-

ance through nonforcible collective pressure can work, and in
the meantime public health experts state that as many as 1,000
Haitian children per month could be dying from the cumulative effects of the political crisis, the domestic turmoil, and the
15. S.C. Res. 841, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (June 16, 1993).
16. S.C. Res. 861, U.N. Doc. S/RES/861 (Aug. 27, 1993).
17. See Howard W. French, HaitiJustice Minister Slain in Defiance of U.S.
Warning to Military to Keep Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1993, at Al.

18. S.C. Res. 867, U.N. Doc. S/RES/867 (Sept. 23, 1993).
19. Steven A. Holmes, Bid to Restore Haiti's Leader is Derailed: U.S. Withdraws Ship and Asks Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1993, at Al.
20. S.C. Res. 873, U.N. Doc. S/RES/873 (Oct. 13, 1993).
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hardships inflicted by the sanctions.2 1 Yet, those who argue
for an external military intervention-whether unilateral or
collective-do not always try to explain how they would overcome the failure of Wilson and his successors who tried to
transplant American-style democracy to Haiti through military
means.
Is the nonforcible international response to the Haitian
crisis capable of serving as a precedent in other such cases, in
this hemisphere or elsewhere? My tentative answer is affirma2
five, with some qualifications that I have discussed elsewhere.
Although collective, nonforcible sanctions may be an imperfect policy instrument, their contribution to norm-reinforcement can be substantial, especially if the relevant regional and
international organizations do in fact build on past precedents
toward a genuine structure of principle (in the dual sense of
normative commitments and consistency of application). The
objection, that certain collective sanctions might not be effective-at least in the short term-against countries that have
the economic wherewithal to resist them deserves attention
both in general and in the context of particular cases; but the
examples of Rhodesia and South Africa support the view that a
longer-term horizon may be more appropriate for evaluating
such measures. Within the Americas, although the hemispheric embargo of Haiti failed to deter two Venezuelan coup
attempts and the auto-golpe in Peru, it is at least arguable that
swift hemispheric pressure (following the Haitian precedent)
did contribute to bringing about a prompt restoration of democratic governance following the Guatemalan coup of June
1993.
21. Howard W. French, Study Says Haiti Sanctions Kill Up to 1,000 Children
a Month, N.Y. Tamfs, Nov. 9, 1993, at A1; cf.Howard W. French, Doctors Question Haiti Health Data, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 24, 1993, at Al (finding flas in the
projectino that the embargo iss causing deaths on the scale of 1,000 a
month); Lincoln C. Chen & Winifred Mm. Fitzgerald, Haitians Suffer 1Wih
and W'Vithout Sanctions, N.Y. Tirws, Nov. 16, 1993, at A26 (stressing cumulative
effects of mulitiple causes of suffering).
22. In my chapter entitled The Civilian Impact of Economic Sanctions, in ENFORCING REsTRAINT, supra note 6, I discuss moral, political, and legal constraints on collective responses that have a devastating effect on the very people whose interests they are supposed to serve. See also Lori Fisler Damrosch,
The Collective Enforcement of InternationalNorms Through Economic Sancioim 8
E-mcs & INTERNTINAL AFAins 59 (1994).
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Yugoslavia

1. Self-Determination or Secession?
Yugoslavia's relation to Wilsonian principles and programs, and in particular to the principle of self-determination,
has always been highly ambiguous. The establishment of the
state of Yugoslavia corresponded to Point XI of Wilson's Fourteen Points; the demise of the same state came about because
of a possibly misguided application of the self-determination
notion which is associated with Wilson.
In the wake of the Yugoslav crisis, sharp controversy has
focused on whether self-determination does or does not, or
should or should not, embody any right of secession from an
existing state. The literature on this question suggests that
Wilson himself may have had no intention of equating selfdetermination with secession. 23 Looking at the question from
the perspective of an international legal system under considerable strain, I endorse the position that the world has been
better served by principles emphasizing the integrity of existing territorial boundaries-no matter how unjust those
boundaries may be in particular cases-than by opening up
those boundaries to nonconsensual change.
Prior to the Yugoslav crisis, the norm of self-determination seemed to have had a settled meaning in international
law: colonized peoples were entitled to eventual independence, to be sure, but other peoples (including ethnic minorities within existing states) would have to be content with "internal self-determination"-that is, rights of political participation, rights to practice their language and culture, and possibly
some acknowledgment of the special status of certain
groups. 24 Following the disintegration of Yugoslavia, commentators have rushed to review those supposedly settled points.
Some have endorsed an activist approach that would involve
the United States (or other outside states) in deciding whether
23. Cf. Max M. Kampelman, Secession and the Right of Self-Determination:
An Urgent Need to Harmonize Principle with Pragmatism, WAsH. Q., Summer
1993 at 5-7 (citing Michla Pomerance, The United States and Self-Determination:
Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conception, 70 AM.J. INT'L L. 1, 2 n.3 (1976)).
24. For the claim that self-determination has had a determinate meaning
and that that meaning did not necessarily entail a right to secession, see
Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 Amt. J.
INT'L L. 46, 52, 54-55, 58-59 (1992).
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to support the emergence of a new state as the most desirable
outcome of an unresolved secessionist struggle. 5 Among the
attractions of this approach is that it could give policyrnakers a
range of nonforcible, yet proactive, policy options with respect
to some kinds of ethnic conflicts.
Nonetheless, I remain doubtful of the prudence of relaxing the restraints found in traditional international law on
outside encouragement of movements whose goal is the
breakup of existing states. In various parts of the world there
are cohesive groups with unsatisfied nationalist aspirations,
whose claims to separate statehood are at least as meritorious
in historical, philosophical, or moral terms as those of the
Croatians or other ex-Yugoslav groups. But it is far from clear
that an activist approach to encouragement of secession is a
salutary development for the evolution of international law or
international relations. Such an approach could open up opportunities for mischief on the part of states interested
in un26
dermining the territorial integrity of existing states.
The norm of nonintervention should serve the dual objectives of preventing, or at least containing, conflict on the one
hand, and enhancing autonomy on the other.2 7 The international legal system has long wrestled with the potential tension
between these two objectives and has attempted to find ways to
vindicate each one without sacrificing the other. In the case of
national and ethnic groups aspiring to separate from a territorially unified state, the international legal system has properly
emphasized the fulfillment of the internationally protected
human rights of individuals and, in some cases, of groups.
Achievement of internalautonomy is entirely compatible with
this approach, as is external pressure to ensure that the
human rights of individuals and minorities are respected. But
25. See Morton H. Halperin & David Scheffer, SEtx-Drm'%tsmttrtoN iN
WORLD ORDER 71-93 (1992).
26. Thus, for example, the reunification of Germany renewed fears in
many quarters that Germany might seek to repossess lands given to Poland
after World War II. Germany's position on Croatia-that "self-determination" entails the right of territorially concentrated ethnic groups to separate
from a state, and that outside powers may encourage such separation-does
nothing to allay such fears, and indeed could have exacerbated them.
27. 1 elaborate on the objectives of conflict containment and autonomy
as elements of the nonintervention norm in ENFORCIN, REsThANT, supra
note 6, at 8-9.
THE NEv
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external encouragement of separatism poses risks to the conflict prevention objective which the international legal system
has heretofore considered to be unacceptable.
In the Yugoslav case, the balance struck between these two
objectives shifted decisively, partly to give greater weight to autonomy considerations, but also out of a consequentialist calculation that intervention by means of recognizing Croatian
independence would help mitigate that particular conflict.
This judgment was not universally shared. U.N. Secretary-General Javier P6rez de Cu6llar, on the recommendation of his
personal envoy Cyrus Vance, predicted that "any early, selective recognition could widen the present conflict and fuel an
explosive situation," especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 28 Subsequent tragic events have caused many to regret that this
warning was not heeded at the time. For the foreseeable future, it may be best to conclude that whatever Wilson may have
meant by self-determination, the dangers of either unrestrained nationalism or external support for secessionist movements are now all too evident.
2.

U.N. Involvement

The dissolution of Yugoslavia, once it had occurred,
changed the legal situation in notable respects. In particular,
the conflict was indisputably an international one by early
1992 at the latest. Characterizations of Serbia as an aggressor
and Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as victims of aggression
had become routine. 29 Nonetheless, the Wilsonian notion of
collective security against aggression was not applied in the
28. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 721, U.N. Doc. S/23280 (1991), para. 25 and Annex IV.
29. The U.N. Security Cotincil has not applied the term "aggression" but
has repeatedly found "threats to the peace" (beginning in Resolution 713 of
September 25, 1991), and has noted that "all parties bear some responsibility
for the situation" (e.g., in Resolution 757 of May 30, 1992). The Council has
targeted its severest measures against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro), beginning with Resolution 757, which imposed a
comprehensive economic embargo. Later resolutions (e.g., Resolution 820
of April 17, 1993) have made the Bosnian Serbs a target of sanctions. See
S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/47, at 42 (1991); S.C.
Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/48, at 131 (1991); S.C.
Res., U.N. Doc. S/RES/820 (Apr. 17, 1993).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

19941

NATIONALISM AND INTERIVATIONALISM

clearcut fashion that had just occurred in the case of Iraq and
Kuwait
Even though the U.N. measures have been utterly inadequate to abate the ongoing carnage, they are important all the
same. Those measures include: imposition of an arms embargo on all of the former Yugoslavia;3 0 comprehensive economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro;3 1 authorization
of forcible measures in the furtherance of specified purposes
(to ensure delivery of humanitarian relief,3 2 to enforce the
economic sanctions,3 3 to enforce the no-fly zone over BosniaHerzegovina,34 and to protect Sarajevo and other locations
that the Security Council has proclaimed as "safe areas");35 establishment of the U.N. Protection Force, which has been carrying out peacekeeping functions in Croatia and providing humanitarian relief in Bosnia-Herzegovina;3 6 and a protective
deployment in Macedonia,3 7 which has helped discourage the
conflict from spreading there.
If the international response to the Yugoslav crisis deserves any credit at all, the best that can be said is that to date
it has helped to contain the conflict within the boundaries of
the former Yugoslavia-and indeed has confined it to only
some of the former Yugoslav republics and has restrained its
spread to other vulnerable Yugoslav regions, such as Kosovo.
Past Balkan crises have been not only virulent, but also contagious. Perhaps the international measures in Yugoslavia are
analogous to early public health achievements in breaking the
chain of transmission of infectious diseases, so as to avoid or
mitigate an epidemic, even though breakthroughs in treatment or cure still lie in the future.
30. S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/47, at 42
(1991).
31. S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/48, at 13
(1992).
32. S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/48, at 24
(1992).
33. S.C. Res. 820, U.N. Doc. S/RES/820 (Apr. 17, 1993), para. 29 (reaffirming S.C. Res. 787 of Nov. 16, 1992).
34. S.C. Res. 816, U.N. Doc. S/RES/816 (Mar. 31, 1993).
35. S.C. Res. 836, U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (June 4, 1993). para. 10.
36. S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/48, at 8
(1992).
37. S.C. Res. 795, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/48, at 37
(1992).
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C. IraqiKurdistan
Kurdish advocates frequently point out that the Kurds are
the largest ethnically distinct and territorially concentrated
group on the planet to have been promised but denied statehood, and indeed that the Kurds have been chronically
thwarted in their quest for self-determination even in more
modest forms (such as autonomy or effective protection of
their rights to maintain their own ethnic identity within existing states). Wilson's legacy is once again ambiguous: he is
implicated both in raising and in dashing Kurdish hopes.
Point XII of Wilson's Fourteen Points declared that the
non-Turkish minorities of the Ottoman Empire should have
the right to "autonomous development." Under the Treaty of
S~vres of 1920, which never went into effect, the Kurds were
supposed to have "local autonomy" in the first instance, and
then they would have the right to apply to the League of Nations for the establishment of a Kurdish state within borders to
be determined through League processes.3 8 This commitment fell apart when Ataturk repudiated the Treaty of S~vres
39
and renegotiated new terms in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923.
With respect to the particular aspects of the plan for which
Wilson himself was responsible, his actions disappointed the
Kurds bitterly. The following account criticizes Wilson's role
as the arbitrator of the Turkish-Armenian frontier:
President Wilson's verdict flew in the face of his own
principles concerning the rights of peoples to self-determination. Without pausing to consult the local
population or to determine its ethnic composition,
he allocated to the Armenian state (which was to be
placed under U.S. mandate) several territories whose
population was mainly Kurdish... in other words a
40
further third of Ottoman Kurdistan.
In the end, the great powers of the interwar period divided oilrich areas in a manner that left what is now Iraqi Kurdistan
under British mandate until the creation of the state of Iraq in
1931.
38. Treaty of Peace U.K.-Allied Powers-Turkey (unratified), arts. 62-64, in
113 BRISH FOREIGN AND STATE PAPERS 652, 666-67.
39. Treaty of Peace, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 12.
40. Kendal, The Kurds Under the Ottoman Empire, in A PEOPLE WIHOUTr A
CoUNrY THE KuRDs AND KuRDIsrAN 35 (Gerard Chaliand, ed., 1993).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

1994]

NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

Iraq's genocidal repression of its Kurdish population antedated its invasion of Kuwait, yet the international community
essentially ignored the well-documented reports of chemical
weapons attacks, eradication of villages, and extermination of
many tens of thousands of Kurds in the final days of the IranIraq war.4 1 Although the devastating campaign against the
Kurds from 1987 to 1989 elicited no meaningful international
response, Saddam Hussein's attack on Kuwait brought about
the first real application of Wilson's conception of a collective
security system, initially through concerted economic sanctions of the sort that Wilson had contemplated for the League,
and a few months later through a multilateral military action
authorized by the U.N. Security Council to eject Iraq from Kuwait.
In the aftermath of Iraq's military defeat, the Kurds in the
north and Shi'ites in the south mounted uprisings which Saddam Hussein moved brutally to crush. Within days of the Security Council's imposition of intrusive cease-fire terms, 42 the
Council adopted Resolution 688,4 3 which called upon Iraq to
end the repression and to begin "an open dialogue.., to ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are
respected;" the resolution also insisted that Iraq must allow
the operation of humanitarian relief efforts. The wording of
the resolution reflects the ambivalence of member states towards the theory underlying their decision, in that it stresses
the effects of Iraq's actions on other states in the region. The
preamble expresses concern over repression of civilians but
hastens to link that repression to transboundary impacts:
Gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including
most recently in Kurdish populated areas which led
to a massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross border incursions,
41. For the most complete account to date, see MinDLE EAST WATCH, GETHE ANFAL CAMPAIGN AGAmST THE KuDs (1993). For the

NOCIDE IN IRAQ:

text of President Wilson's arbitral award, see "The Frontier Between Armenia and Turkey as Decided by President Woodrow Wilson, Nov. 22, 1920"
(published by the Armenian National Committee).
42. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/47, at 27
(1991).
43. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/47, at 31
(1991).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

1N-rERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

[Vol. 26:493

which threaten international peace and security in
the region ....,44
While the resolution addresses itself to Iraq in emphatic fashion, it stops short of formal invocation of Chapter VII: on this
basis, China was willing to abstain (but had made known that a
more intrusive approach would elicit a veto).
In the ensuing period, multinational military forces entered Iraqi Kurdistan to provide humanitarian relief. A small
contingent of U.N. guards was later deployed for humanitarian purposes pursuant to a memorandum of understanding
with Iraq, 45 but the guards' position has been tenuous in view
of the need to secure Iraqi consent to periodic renewal of the
memorandum of understanding, as well as an adequate measure of Iraqi cooperation with their activities. Coalition forces
operating out of Turkey and the Persian Gulf have afforded
continuous military protection to Iraqi Kurdistan north of the
36th parallel and have designated the Shi'ite marshland area
south of the 32nd parallel as a no-fly zone. The multinational
military activities, including the establishment and surveillance
of the no-fly zones, have proceeded on a de facto basis in view
of China's attitudes (which have precluded any more explicit
endorsement of these activities than can be inferred from the
normative content of the series of resolutions).46
Partition of Iraq continues to be actively discouraged,
while the international community has recognized the dissolution of Yugoslavia and moved closer to accepting a partition of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Concerns about the breakup of existing
states (suggested in the Yugoslav section above) also apply to
Kurdish separatism, whether in Iraq, Turkey, or elsewhere.
While I do not argue for the creation of a Kurdish state at
the present time, I do believe that the international community has a responsibility to ensure effective protection of the
Iraqi Kurds against any renewal of the repression that both
preceded and followed the genocide of the late 1980s. This
44. Id pmbl.
45. LETTER DATED 30

MAY 1991 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, U.N. Doc. S/22663 (May 31,

1991).
46. For discussion of the points in this paragraph, see Jane Stromseth,
Iraq's Repression of Its Civilain Population: Collective Responses and Continuing
Cahlenges, in ENFORCING REsrRmrr, supra note 6, at 77, and see also "Concluding Reflections" Id at 348, 357.
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responsibility is currently being discharged through the policing of the no-fly zones; forcible responses to any Iraqi threat
to the Kurdish region would also be justified in my view. The
Clinton Administration has renewed the previous sharp warnings (in which the U.N. delegates of the U.S., U.K, France and
Russia had joined earlier in the year) promising a "firm and
47
united response" to any Iraqi attack on the Kurdish region.
Thus, we see a new variant on Wilsonian collective security,
offered to victims of internal rather than external aggression.
III.

CONCLUSION

As a lawyer concerned with the operation of principles
within institutions, I conclude with a few observations on the
problem of "principles" more generally. 48 My concern here is
not the substantive merit of particular claims of principle, but
rather the cross-cutting issues of whether formulation of general principles on intervention is even possible, and whether
the system is capable of acting consistently across substantially
similar cases.
Some scholars have called for new treaties on intervention
as a means of advancing the effort to crystallize a normative
consensus. 4 9 While such measures are conceivable on a regional, or subglobal, as well as a general basis, any attempt to
codify a consensus that is still in the process of formation
would not only be premature, but could even be counterproductive. Rigid verbal formulations could retard necessary
evolution and work against flexibility;, insistence that states go
on record for or against proposals might polarize their positions rather than promote consensus. In any event, the very
regimes whose repressive character would make them the
most appropriate targets for justifiable intervention would be
the least likely to agree to such a system.
47. See Douglas Jehl, Christopher Warns Iraqi ChiefNot to Attac Kurds in
North, N.Y. Tmms, May 25, 1993, at A8. The warning applies not only to the
northern no-fly zone, but also to territories south of the zone under Kurdish
control.
48. See Concluding Reflections, in ENFORCING REsrRAINT, sira note 6, at
360-63, as well as my Civilian Impact chapter in id. at 305-07.
49. Two different treaty proposals can be found in Stanley Hoffmann,
Delusions of World Order,N.Y. REv. OF BooKs, Apr. 9, 1992, at 37, 51; TomJ.
Farer, A Paradigmof Legitimate Intervention, in ENF'ORCING REusrAINT, supra
note 6, at 316, 322.
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In my view, a better alternative to the unlikelihood of a
general codification of evolving norms is the current approach
of arriving at a case-specific consensus within the Security
Council and then building on each new precedent as newer
cases arise. This approach, however, is vulnerable to the criticism that it results in selective and inconsistent collective responses, and thus is "unprincipled" in the sense of proceeding
only on the basis of interest. This criticism should be taken
seriously but also placed in perspective.
The objective of treating like cases alike is fundamental to
the evolution of a system based on law rather than only on raw
power. Legal scholars have underscored that in order for a
system to be viewed as legitimate and for its rules to exert a
normative "pull" toward compliance, those rules must be seen
as fitting within a coherent structure of principle, with consistent application in similar cases. 50 It may be a long time
before the international community will be able to act on the
principle of treating like cases alike-even as to well-established norms with determinate content and acknowledged
pedigree, 5 1 let alone norms that are still in flux, as is surely the
case with norms of intervention. But with a view toward
achieving the realization of that objective sooner rather than
later, it may be helpful to identify some of the factors that
hamper principled collective action and to consider how they
may be overcome.
The political reality is that effective action comes about
when one or more strong states have interests that motivate
them to take initiatives; otherwise, inertia generally prevails.
Institutions provide arenas for coordinating state initiatives
and mobilizing pressure for action, but they have heretofore
lacked autonomous capabilities. Interventions are costly, not
only financially, but also in risk to human life. Thus, the international community has chosen to act selectively-where the
likelihood of achieving the desired result is substantial, where
the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs, and where
one or more states have been motivated to exercise leadership.
In view of obvious limitations on resources and political will, it
50. See T. FRANcK, THE POWER OF LEGTMACy AMONG NATIONS 150-82
(1990).
51. Franck elaborates on the concepts of determinacy and pedigree. See
Franck, supra note 49, at 41-110.
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may be ambitious enough to seek to address a few problems in
an admittedly ad hoc and imperfect way.
Fears about establishing potentially unwise precedents
have motivated some actors to prefer no action to ill-advised
action. But to offer the concept of principle as a rationale for
inaction would be a misuse of the concept. The fact that the
system is incapable of responding effectively to all (or even to
very many) crises is not a valid excuse for failing to act. When
some action is possible, small achievements will lead to greater
ones, and eventually to patterns that will reflect underlying
principles. Thus, paradoxically, the strategy of choosing to respond selectively in the near term may produce the body of
experience that will be necessary to realize the longer-term objective of treating like cases alike.
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